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“[A]ll the vexatious and annoying machinery of the custom-house, and the vigilance of its
officers, are imposed by law to prevent even the smallest evasion of [the customs laws of the
United States]."
-Justice Samuel Freeman Miller (1882)1
“The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few people
who may pose overwhelming risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.”
-The 9/11 Commission Report (2004)2
Introduction
In 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel stationed abroad
precleared eighteen million travelers, over fifteen percent of all commercial air travelers to the
United States.3 Generally, at Preclearance locations, CBP officers inspect travelers for
compliance with U.S. law before they board an aircraft bound for the United States, which
eliminates the need for customs processing upon arrival.4 CBP currently has fifteen air
Preclearance locations in six countries recently concluded two agreements to cover locations in
Sweden and the Dominican Republic, and is negotiating with several more countries interested in
establishing Preclearance locations.5

1

Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 218 (1882).

2

The 9/11 Commission Report 383 (2004), available at http:// www.9-

11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
3

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Preclearance Locations, https://www.cbp.gov/border-

security/ports-entry/operations/preclearance (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
4

Id.

5

Id. The countries in which CBP already has Preclearance locations are Ireland, Aruba, The

Bahamas, Bermuda, United Arab Emirates, and Canada.
1

Meanwhile, on November 12, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts became the latest court to express its opinion on the constitutionality of
suspicionless forensic electronic border searches in Alasaad v. Nielsen.6 Judge Denise Casper
held that all electronic border searches require reasonable suspicion, taking the more popular
position on the electronic border search debate.7 This debate over what level of suspicion
forensic electronic border searches require has raged with particular ferocity since May 2018,
when the Eleventh Circuit created a split among the lower courts.8 The conviction with which
both sides of the debate have argued is understandable. On one side are privacy advocates
pointing to the 2014 Supreme Court decision Riley v. California, in which the Court found that
the search-incident-to-arrest exception did not apply to cell phones because of the heightened
privacy interests that such technology implicates.9 Law enforcement advocates citing customs

6

No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019), appeal docketed,

No. 20-1081 (1st Cir. Jan. 29, 2020); see also Sophia Cope et al., Federal Judge Issues Historic
Opinion for Digital Privacy at the Border, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/11/federal-judge-issues-historic-opinion-digital-privacyborder.
7

Alasaad, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *14.

8

United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018).

9

See e.g., Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches after Riley v. California, 90

Wash. L. Rev. 1943, 1946 (2015) (arguing that Riley supports “requiring at least reasonable
suspicion, if not probable cause, for digital border searches”).
2

authorities’ centuries-old authority to conduct suspicionless border searches represent the other
side.10
One aspect of the electronic border search debate that has not received much attention is
the regular execution of such searches at extraterritorial locations, namely foreign airports in
countries which have Preclearance Agreements with the United States. Thus far, only one court
has litigated the validity of extraterritorial border searches.11 However, although the Ninth
Circuit thoroughly examined the extent to which the U.S.-Canada Preclearance Agreement
authorized the search, it only briefly examined the reasonableness of the search in question under
the Fourth Amendment.12
This Comment will argue that forensic extraterritorial electronic border searches for
contraband do not require individualized suspicion. Although forensic electronic border searches
for contraband at the U.S. border and ports of entry (e.g., interior airports) may require, at most,
reasonable suspicion according to some courts, the further reduced privacy expectations and
further magnified governments interests involved in extraterritorial border searches dictate that

10

See e.g., Michael Creta, Comment, A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Ninth Circuit Requires

Reasonable Suspicion for Forensic Examinations of Electronic Storage Devices During Border
Searches in United States v. Cotterman, 55 B.C. L. Rev. E-Supplement 31 (2014) (contending
that a reasonable suspicion requirement is impractical and harmful to national security).
11

United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1986). In Alasaad v. Nielsen, one plaintiff

was searched at a Toronto Preclearance Station, but the court did not address the extraterritorial
element. No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *4.
12

Walczak, 783 F.2d at 856.
3

forward-operating border officers merely adhere to the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness with respect to U.S. persons. To support this argument, this Comment will
proceed in five parts, first summarizing jurisprudence regarding the border search exception and
routine versus non-routine border searches.13
Second, it will examine recent case law examining the validity of electronic border
searches.14 Third, this Comment will review the relatively sparse jurisprudence regarding the
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment.15 Fourth, it will argue that electronic
border searches within or at traditional U.S. borders require, at most, reasonable suspicion,
although the necessary level of suspicion in this sphere is far from resolved.16 Fifth, this
Comment will analyze the necessary level of suspicion for electronic border searches at
Preclearance locations in light of jurisprudence regarding the extraterritorial application of the
Fourth Amendment.17 It should be noted that this Comment only focuses on those Fourth
Amendment protections to which U.S. persons are entitled and, further, does not address
electronic border searches for the purpose of finding general evidence of wrongdoing.18 Further,

13

See infra part I, I.A, and I.A.1-2.

14

See infra part I.A.3.

15

See infra part I.A.4.

16

See infra part II.A.

17

See infra part II.B.

18

To read comments that do address electronic border searches for the purpose of finding

general evidence of wrongdoing, see generally Kelly A. Gilmore, Note, Preserving the Border
Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at the Border, 72 Brook.
4

this Comment examines the required level of suspicion for searches of electronic devices in
general because, in addition to ensuring that this Comment is more concise and cogent, if no
Supreme Court precedent supports distinguishing between electronic devices and other types of
property at the border, it is equally baseless—and imposes unnecessary constraints on CBP
officers and introduces complexity that is anathema to the border search doctrine—to distinguish
between different types of electronic devices.19
I.

Background
The Fourth Amendment states, in relevant part, “The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . .”20 Two years before the
Fourth Amendment was ratified, the First U.S. Congress promulgated the Act of July 31, 1789.21

L. Rev. 759 (2007) (contending that neither the initial inspection nor the replication of digital
evidence at the border is subject to a standard of reasonable suspicion) and Ashley H. Verdon,
Comment, International Travel with a “Digital Briefcase”: If Customs Officials Can Search a
Laptop, Will the Right Against Self-Incrimination Contravene This Authority? 37 Pepp. L. Rev.
105 (2009) (arguing for the creation of a border search exception to the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination for laptops).
19

Infra part II.A.1.

20

U.S. Const. amend. IV

21

1 St. 29, 43, § 24 (“[E]very collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially

appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any
ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise
5

This legislation authorized customs officers “to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have
reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and
therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise.”22 However, with
respect to dwelling-houses, stores, and other buildings, such as warehouses, the act required
customs officers to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search.23 Thus, the border search
exception was born, before there was even a Fourth Amendment to which one could take
exception.24

subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods,
wares or merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any
particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon
application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter
such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such goods, and if
any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial . . . .”).
22

Id. Interestingly, some courts have compared border searches of electronic media to searches

of ship cabins at the border. See e.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir.
2018) (“[W]e have upheld ‘a search without reasonable suspicion of a crew member’s living
quarters on a foreign cargo vessel that [wa]s entering this country,’ even though ‘[a] cabin is a
crew member’s home—and a home ‘receives the greatest Fourth Amendment protection
(citations omitted).’”).
23

Id.

24

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (“As this act was passed by the same

Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear
6

Subsequent case law would later interpret “reason to suspect” and determine the required
level of suspicion for border searches under a variety of circumstances.25 Nonetheless, this act
elucidates that, “from the earliest days of the Republic, customs inspectors could board vessels to
search for contraband without first obtaining a warrant.”26 A short time later, the Act of March 2,
1799 granted customs officials plenary authority to search the baggage of persons entering the
country “whenever the collector . . . shall think proper to do so.”27
Almost seventy years later, Congress passed another significant piece of legislation that
clarified customs officers’ authority regarding vehicles and goods crossing the border. The Act
of July 18, 1866 permitted a customs officer to stop and search “any vehicle, beast, or person on
which or whom he . . . shall suspect there are goods, wares, or merchandise which are subject to

that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’
and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.”); see also United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977) (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623) (explaining that border
searches are not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment)
25

See infra part I.A.

26

Laura K. Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights: Constitutional Limits on Electronic

Border Searches, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 961, 974-75 (2019) (“[F]rom the earliest days of the
Republic, customs inspectors could board vessels to search for contraband without first obtaining
a warrant.”).
27

Ch. 22, § 46, 1 Stat. 662.
7

duty or shall have been introduced into the United States in any matter contrary to law.”28 In
1925, the Court decided Carroll v. United States.29 It noted in dicta that “[t]ravellers may be so
stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings
as effects which may be lawfully brought in.”30 In its last significant piece of legislation before
CBP’s border search authority was challenged for one of the first times in United States v.
Ramsey more than four decades later, Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.31
One notable section provided that “all persons coming into the United States from foreign
countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the
Government.”32 The next section will examine the development of the modern border search

28

See also Act of July 18, 1866, An Act further to prevent Smuggling and for other Purposes, ch.

201, 14 Stat. 178 (1866). See generally Laura K. Donohue, supra note 26 (discussing the early
history of the border search exception).
29

267 U.S. 132 (1925).

30

Id. at 154.

31

Ch. 679, 52 Stat. 1077, 1083 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1467 (2018)); see also

Donahue, supra note 26, at 977 (“[T]he law empowers customs officers, acting pursuant to
regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service, to ‘enforce, cause
inspection, examination, and search to be made of the persons, baggage, and merchandise
discharged or unladen from’ vessels arriving at U.S. ports, regardless of whether the goods have
previously undergone inspection.”)
32

Section 582, 52 Stat. 1077, 1083.
8

exception, including the Court’s three most important border search decisions in the last fortyfive years and lower courts’ application of such decisions to electronic media.
A.

The Modern Border Search Exception

In 1977, after almost two centuries without direct challenge, the Court first addressed
CBP’s border search authority in United States v. Ramsey.33 The defendant and others had
conducted an international “heroin-by-mail enterprise,” smuggling such contraband into the
Washington, D.C. area from Thailand using letter-sized envelopes.34 A customs officer,
inspecting international air mail from Thailand, spotted eight envelopes that were bulky.35 Given
that Thailand was a known source for narcotics, that one of the letters felt as though it contained
something other than correspondence, and that one of the letters weighed three to six times the
weight of a normal airmail letter, the customs officer suspected that the envelopes might contain
merchandise or contraband rather than correspondence and opened the heavy letter.36 Inside was
a plastic bag containing a white powdered substance that he tested and determined to be heroin.37
The Court found that the Act of July 18, 1866 authorized the search and that it was
otherwise permissible under the Fourth Amendment.38 With respect to the latter, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned, “[t]hat searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of

33

431 U.S. 606 (1977)

34

Id. at 608.

35

Id. at 609.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 610.

38

Id. at 615, 624-25.
9

the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now,
require no extended demonstration.”39 Thus, because the officer conducted the search at the

39

Id. at 616 (emphasis added); see also Nat. Treasury Empl. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,

670 (1989) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)) (“We have long held
that travelers seeking to enter the country may be stopped and required to submit to a routine
search without probable cause, or even founded suspicion, ‘because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.’”). Note that Justice Rehnquist found
that there was no legally significant difference between envelopes mailed and envelopes carried
across the border. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (“The critical fact is that the envelopes cross the
border and enter this country, not that that are brought in by one mode of transportation rather
than another. It is their entry into this country from without it that makes a resulting search
‘reasonable.’”).
10

functional equivalent of the border,40 it was reasonable.41 Justice Rehnquist declined to
determine “whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed
‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”42 The
sole dissenting opinion merely disagreed that the Act of July 18, 1866 authorized the search, not
finding any fault with Justice Rehnquist’s Fourth Amendment analysis.43
1.

“Routine” Versus “Nonroutine” Border Searches

In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,44 the Court began to define the contours of
reasonable border searches, finding that routine searches do not require individualized suspicion,
but that nonroutine searches do.45 In this case, customs inspector Talamantes detained the

40

Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (noting that domestic

airports receiving nonstop flights from other countries and established stations near the border
are examples of a “functional equivalent” of the border (FEB)) and Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616
(assuming that a New York City post office that receives international mail is a FEB) with
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 274 (holding that a search by a roving patrol of the U.S. Border
Patrol on a highway that is at all points at least twenty miles north of the Mexican border) and
Torres v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472 (1979) (finding that luggage searches of
persons arriving in Puerto Rico from the United States do not constitute border searches)
41

Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620.

42

Id. at 618 n. 13.

43

Id. at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

44

473 U.S. 531 (1985).

45

Id. at 541.
11

defendant after arriving in Los Angeles on a direct flight from Bogota, Colombia—a source city
for controlled substances—when he noticed from her passport that she had made eight recent
trips to either Miami or Los Angeles.46 The defendant also possessed $5,000 in cash, mostly in
$50 bills, and her stated purpose for travelling to the United States was unconvincing, as even
Justice Rehnquist’s rendition of the facts implied.47
At this point, Talamantes, who had apprehended dozens of alimentary smugglers arriving
on the same flight as the defendant, suspected that she was smuggling narcotics in her alimentary
canal and requested a female customs inspector to take the defendant to a private area and
conduct a patdown and strip search.48 During the search, the female inspector felt what she
thought was a girdle and noticed that the defendant was wearing two pairs of elastic underpants
with a paper towel lining the crotch area.49 Later, after about twenty hours in detention, a

46

Id. at 533.

47

Id. at 533-34; see also id. (“Talamantes and another inspector asked respondent general

questions concerning herself and the purpose of her trip. Respondent revealed that she spoke no
English and had no family or friends in the United States. She explained in Spanish that she had
come to the United States to purchase goods for her husband's store in Bogota . . . . She indicated
to the inspectors that she had no appointments with merchandise vendors, but planned to ride
around Los Angeles in taxicabs visiting retail stores such as J.C. Penney and K-Mart in order to
buy goods for her husband's store with the $5,000.”)
48

Id. at 534.

49

Id.
12

physician conducted a rectal examination of the defendant pursuant to a court order, removing a
balloon with cocaine in it.50
The Court, represented again by Justice Rehnquist, found that the search of the
defendant’s alimentary canal was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.51 Justice Rehnquist
began, “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary
authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a
warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband
into this country.”52 Citing Ramsey, he further noted that routine searches of the persons and
effects of entrants do not require individualized suspicion.53 However, Justice Rehnquist
ultimately, and narrowly, held that alimentary canal searches require reasonable suspicion after
balancing the defendant’s heightened privacy interests—due to the invasion of her person—with
the Government’s heightened interest in preventing smuggling, travelers’ reduced expectation of
privacy at the border, and the great difficulty of detecting alimentary smuggling.54 Further,
although he declined to rule on the required level of suspicion for “nonroutine border searches
such as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches,” Justice Rehnquist’s primary holding
implied that alimentary canal searches are nonroutine and that nonroutine searches require at

50

Id. at 535; id. at 546 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

51

Id. at 544.

52

Id. at 537 (emphasis added).

53

Id. at 538.

54

Id. at 538-41.
13

least reasonable suspicion.55 Regardless, Justice Rehnquist found that the above facts “clearly
supported a reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was an alimentary smuggler.”56
In the Court’s most recent decision on CBP’s border search authority, United States v.
Flores-Montano,57 it held that a gas tank search does not require individualized suspicion.58 The
defendant attempted to enter the United States at a southern California port of entry.59 During a
second inspection of the defendant’s vehicle, a customs inspector inspected the gas tank by
tapping it and noted that it sounded solid.60 The inspector then requested a mechanic to remove
the tank, after which the inspector dissembled it and discovered thirty-seven kilograms of
marijuana bricks inside.61 Now-Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the gas tank search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.62 Before reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit yet again, he admonished the lower court, “the reasons that might support a
requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person . . .

55

Id. at 541, n. 4. Note that all the searches listed are of one’s person. See also id. at 551

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing body-cavity searches, x-ray searches, and stomach-pumping
as highly intrusive).
56

Id. at 542.

57

541 U.S. 149 (2004).

58

Id. at 150.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 151.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 155-56.
14

simply do not carry over to vehicles.”63 Chief Justice Rehnquist elaborated, “[t]he Government's
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international
border.”64 In other words, the Government has a “paramount interest in protecting[] its territorial
integrity” that sharply contrasts with a traveler’s reduced expectations of privacy at the border.65
Although he conceded that “some searches of property are so destructive as to require a different
result,” Chief Justice Rehnquist held that “this [search] was not one of them.”66 Notably, in this
case, no justice dissented.67
2.

Privacy Interests Regarding Searches of One’s Person

Searches of one’s person vis-à-vis searches of property implicate disparate magnitudes of
privacy interests, as implied in Montoya de Hernandez’s identification of only personal searches
as nonroutine and explicitly discussed in Flores-Montano with respect to people and vehicles.68

63

Id. at 152 (emphasis added).

64

Id. (emphasis added).

65

Id. at 153.

66

Id. at 155-156.

67

Further, Justice Breyer’s three-sentence concurring opinion merely noted that CBP’s

recordkeeping with respect to its border searches should minimize concerns that the agency will
conduct gas tank searches in an abusive manner.
68

Id. at 152; see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985); id. at

542.
15

Border search jurisprudence contains a distinction between searches of property and searches of
persons that parallels the one found in the broader Fourth Amendment case law.69
In Terry v. Ohio, regarding police patdowns for weapons, the Court noted that “[e]ven a
limited search of the outer clothing . . . constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon
cherished personal security.”70 Further, it stated in Missouri v. McNeely, a DWI case involving a
warrantless blood test, that “an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’”71 Schmerber v. California came down the
opposite way of McNeely, and the Court found the warrantless blood test was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment based on the particular facts of the case.72 In other cases, the Court
proscribed compelled surgical removal of a bullet from the defendant for evidentiary purposes73

69

E.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.

70

See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (describing the taking of a suspect’s

fingernail scrapings as a “severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security”).
71

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).

72

384 U.S. 757, 722 (1966); cf. id. (“It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment

only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that
it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”)
73

See Winston, 470 U.S. at 759 (“A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for

evidence, however, implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the
intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”).
16

and forced stomach pumping.74 At least three circuits have constructed or positively cited tests
for determining whether a border search is routine based primarily on physical factors such as
use of force and exposure of intimate body parts.75
3.

Searches of Electronic Media

Before addressing jurisprudence regarding searches of electronic media at the border, one
must examine case law ruling on such searches in the interior since the Court has ruled on the
latter and not the former. Further, decisions like Riley v. California76 and Carpenter v. United

74

See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (“It would be a stultification of the

responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in
order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what
is in his stomach.”).
75

See United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 295 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) (echoing Montoya de

Hernandez’s identification of only physical searches as nonroutine and citing United States v.
Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984) (identifying three factors, including: (1)
“physical contact between the searcher and the person searched”; (2) “exposure of intimate body
parts”; and (3) “use of force”) and United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir.1988)
(describing six factors including: (1) whether the search requires exposure of intimate body parts
or removal of clothing; (2) physical contact between the searcher and the suspect; (3) use of
force; (4) whether the suspect is subjected to pain or danger; (5) the overall manner in which the
search is conducted; and (6) whether reasonable expectations of privacy are abrogated by the
search))
76

573 U.S. 373 (2014).
17

States77 have—perhaps inadvertently—signaled to many lower courts that all electronic searches,
whether at the border or not, trigger heightened privacy concerns. In Riley, the Court held that
searches of cellphones incident to a lawful arrest require a warrant.78 Normally, under Chimel v.
California, ensuring officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence justify a
warrantless search incident to arrest.79 However, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that neither of
these rationales apply to cellphones seized after an arrest of a cellphone’s owner has taken
place.80
First, Chief Justice Roberts noted that data poses no threat to officer safety.81 Second, he
characterized the Government’s chief concerns with respect to the destruction of evidence—
remote wiping and encryption—as insufficient justifications to dispense with the warrant
requirement.82 More specifically, he wrote that officers could simply turn the phone off or
remove its battery to prevent remote wiping or, if they are concerned about encryption, leave the
phone powered on and place it in a aluminum foil sandwich bag.83 Chief Justice Roberts next

77

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

78

Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.

79

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

80

Riley, 573 U.S. at 387-91.

81

Id. at 387.

82

Id. at 388-91.

83

Id. at 390. Chief Justice Roberts also noted that, if the police were confronted with a “now or

never” situation, such an imminent remote-wipe attempt, they may be able to rely on exigent
circumstances to search the phone immediately without a warrant. Id. at 391.
18

discussed the heightened privacy concerns that cellphone searches implicate due to the volume
and variety of information they can hold and what such information can reveal about the
cellphone owner.84 He also argued that, not only do cell phones contain in digital form many
sensitive records previously found in the home, they also contain information never found in a
home in any form.85
In Carpenter, the Court found that the Government conducts a search when it accesses
historical cellphone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past
movements, otherwise known as cell-site location information (CSLI).86 Writing again for the

84

Id. at 393-97.

85

Id. at 396-97. But cf. Ric Simmons, Why 2007 is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on

Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 531, 534 (2007) (“Just as George Orwell misunderstood the implication of new
technologies by focusing only on their use by government agents, Fourth Amendment scholars
all but ignore the ways in which technology has enabled average citizens and criminals to keep
their activities hidden from law enforcement.”). Compare id. at 540 (“[O]ne of the primary
effects of technology on society over the past two hundred years has been to increase the amount
of privacy in our everyday lives. Individuals—including criminals—can now conduct many
more activities secretly, particularly activities which involve communicating, storing, or
processing information.”) with United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quotations
marks omitted) (emphasis added) (“At bottom, we must assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”).
86

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
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majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the defendant had a reasonable expectation that law
enforcement agents would not and could not secretly monitor and catalogue his every movement
over a long period of time and that the Government invaded this expectation of privacy when it
obtained court orders to acquire the defendant’s CLSI from his telecommunication providers.87
Thus, he maintained, the Government will need a warrant in the future to access CSLI, unless an
exception—such as exigent circumstances—applies.88
However, Carpenter need not be read as a prohibition on the warrantless access of all data
stored on electronic devices. Many lower courts have already held as much.89 Further, in a March

87

Id.

88

Id. at 2222 (“[C]ase-specific exceptions may support a warrantless search of an individual's

cell-site records under certain circumstances.”).
89

See United States v. VanDyck, 776 Fed. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2019) (declining to extend

Carpenter to IP addresses); United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2019) (same); United
States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 Fed. App’x 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (same, plus subscriber
information); United States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that Carpenter
“did not invalidate warrantless tower dumps (which identified phones near one location (the
victim stores) at one time (during the robberies))”); cf. United States v. Saemisch, 371 F. Supp.
3d 37, 42 (D. Mass. 2019) (“Carpenter does not provide an answer to the question whether the
brief collection of real-time (as distinguished from historical) CSLI for an individual already
subject to an arrest warrant implicates the Fourth Amendment.”). But cf. Daniel de Zayas,
Comment, Carpenter v. United States and the Emerging Expectation of Privacy in Data
20

2019 decision situated more squarely within the border search context, the Seventh Circuit noted
that “[a]lthough both [Riley and Carpenter] support [the defendant]’s general argument that the
Supreme Court has recently granted heightened protection to cell phone data, neither case
addresses searches at the border where the government’s interests are at their zenith, and neither
case addresses data stored on other electronic devices such as portable hard drives and
laptops.”90
4.

Searches of Electronic Media at the Border

In 2017, CBP officers conducted approximately 30,200 searches of electronic devices at
the border, roughly four times more than those conducted in 2015.91 However, despite the
notoriety and litigation surrounding such searches, they only impacted 0.007 percent of the 397
million international travelers processed by CBP officers in 2017.92 Although officers usually

Comprehensiveness Applied to Browsing History, 68 Am. U. L. Rev. 2209, 2245 (2019)
(arguing that Carpenter applies to browsing history).
90

United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 484 (7th Cir. 2019).

91

CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and FY17 Statistics,

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/nationalmedia-release/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-electronic-device-directive-and (last visited
November 2, 2019).
92

Id. Given the massive volume of travelers that CBP processes annually, officers are unlikely to

have the time, nor the inclination, to thoroughly examine “the jokes at which [travelers] have
laughed” during an electronic search, contrary to what some commentators have suggested.
Donohue, supra note 26, at 966.
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have at least reasonable suspicion for more extensive searches,93 they also conduct a certain
percentage of random searches of persons who appear entirely innocent for deterrence
purposes.94
Digital contraband can include child sexual abuse imagery, nuclear weapons designs,
counterfeit currencies, classified information, classified information that requires an export
license, stolen intellectual property, and more. 95 Child sexual abuse imagery, in particular, is a

93

United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 570 (D. Md. 2014).

94

United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 979 (9th Cir. 2013) (Callahan, J., dissenting in

part).
95

Donohue, supra note 26, at 1009 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1583(a)(1), (2) (2018) (warrantless

searches of international mail for obscenity and child sexual abuse imagery); 6 U.S.C. §
211(c)(2) (2018) (requiring CBP to ensure “the interdiction of persons and goods illegally
entering or existing the United States”); id. § 211(c)(5) (requiring CBP to “detect, respond to,
and interdict terrorists . . . and other persons who may undermine the security of the United
States”); id. § 211(c)(6) (requiring CBP to “safeguard the borders of the United States to protect
against the entry of dangerous goods”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2018) (prohibiting the
knowing international transportation or shipment of child sexual abuse imagery); id. § 2252(a)(2)
(prohibiting receipt or distribution of child sexual abuse imagery); id. § 2252(4) (outlawing
possession of child sexual abuse imagery); 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)(1)(A) (providing for the
examination of outbound mail); 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2018) (requiring the reporting of the export
and import of certain monetary instruments)); Kelly A. Gilmore, Note, Preserving the Border
Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at the Border, 72 Brook.
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massive problem.96 CBP inspectors search for such contraband either manually, forensically, or
both. Manual, or “basic,” searches are “examinations of an electronic device that do not entail
the use of external equipment or software.”97 Forensic, or “advanced,” searches “involve the

L. Rev. 759, 787 (2007) (“As the rest of the world has turned to laptops and wireless
communication devices for the storage of personal information, it appears terrorists have as well.
During the investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, officials found
detailed plans to destroy U.S. bound airliners in encrypted files on the suicide bomber's laptop.”)
96

See A Criminal Underworld of Child Abuse, Part 1, The Daily (Feb. 19, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/podcasts/the-daily/child-sex-abuse.html (describing child
sexual abuse imagery as reaching epidemic proportions ten years ago when only 600,000 images
and videos were reported to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children annually,
and in 2018, 45 million images and videos were reported); A Criminal Underworld of Child
Abuse, Part 2, The Daily (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/podcasts/thedaily/child-sex-abuse.html (noting that, in 2019, there were 70 million reports of child sexual
abuse imagery—a more than fifty percent increase—and that this problem may only get worse as
the one platform that vigorously polices itself, Facebook, transitions away from automatic
scanning of images and videos transmitted via its messenger service to ameliorate user privacy
concerns). An interesting question that these podcast episodes raise is whether the privacy of the
people who transmit these images can coexist with the privacy of the abused children who
appear in them. Id. In other words, does shielding the transmission of these images completely
deny privacy to the exploited subjects of such images?
97

United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 n.6 (4th Cir. 2018).
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connection of external equipment to a device…in order to review, copy, or analyze its
contents.”98
Since the Court has not yet ruled on the level of suspicion required for electronic border
searches, whether manual or forensic, this Comment must undertake a brief survey of relevant
lower court decisions to understand the debate surrounding this issue. A plurality of circuits have
held that reasonable suspicion is not required for forensic electronic border searches or have
issued opinions that are consistent with United States v. Touset, the Eleventh Circuit’s 2018
circuit-splitting decision that defied the Ninth Circuit’s reasonable-suspicion requirement.99

98

Id.

99

See e.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v.

Jenkins, No. 5:11-CR-0602 (GTS), 2013 WL 12204395 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013) (finding that
forensic electronic border searches are routine, so long as they are not destructive of the device
or carried out in a particularly offensive manner); United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016
WL 894452 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016); United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 484 (7th Cir.
2019); cf. United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 Fed. App’x. 506 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
camcorders, as well as other electronic devices, may be searched without reasonable suspicion).
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Further, four circuits—the Fifth,100 Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit101—have not directly or
materially ruled on this issue. That leaves the Ninth102 and Fourth103 Circuits, which have clearly
required reasonable suspicion for forensic electronic border searches, and the First104 Circuit,

100

United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 267 F. Supp. 3d 900 (W.D. Tex. 2016), aff’d, 884 F.3d 287

(5th Cir. 2018) (resolving case on good faith exception). But cf. Molina-Isidoro, 267 F. Supp. 3d
at 908 (declining to extend Riley to searches of cell phones at the border); Molina-Isidoro, 884
F.3d at 292 (concluding that government agents may reasonably view Riley as not overriding
caselaw that allows warrantless border searches of cellphones).
101

See e.g., United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to decide

the required level of suspicion); United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. 2015) (same).
102

United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Cotterman, 709

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013).
103

United States v. Aigbkaen, 943 F.3d 713, 720 (4th Cir. 2019); cf. United States v. Kolsuz,

890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018) (resolving the case on the good faith exception in favor of the
Government, but doing so because the CBP officers’ search was based on a reasonable suspicion
that the electronic device in question contained contraband).
104

See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *1 (D. Mass. Nov.

12, 2019). But see United States v. Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing
United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512-13 (1st Cir. 1988)) (finding that only highly intrusive
searches of the person and destructive property searches are non-routine).
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which appears to be moving in the same direction. Notably, the Court has repeatedly reversed
Ninth Circuit border search decisions.105
In Touset, as noted above, the Eleventh Circuit held that “no suspicion is necessary to
search electronic devices at the border.”106 In this case, Xoom, a company that transmits money,
notified Yahoo that it suspected that several of its email account holders were involved with
child sexual abuse imagery based on a pattern of frequent low-money transfers to an individual
in source countries for sex tourism and child sexual abuse imagery.107 Yahoo then conducted its
own investigation and found a file with child sexual abuse imagery in the account for the email
address iloveyousomuch0820@yahoo.com, which listed a phone number in the Philippines.108
After Yahoo contacted the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, the Center
contacted the Cyber Crime Center of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).109 DHS
eventually discovered a Western Union account associated with the above email address that
engaged in low-money transfers that listed the defendant’s name and a post office box in
Marietta, Georgia.110 When the defendant arrived on an international flight in Atlanta, CBP

105

Samuel A. Townsend, Note, Laptop Searches at the Border and United States v. Cotterman,

94 B.U. L. Rev. 1745, 1746 (2014) (providing Montoya de Hernandez and Flores-Montano as
examples).
106

United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).

107

Id. at 1230.

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Id.
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officers searched his luggage, which contained an iPhone, a camera, two laptops, two external
hard drives, and two tablets.111 A forensic search of the laptops and hard drives revealed child
sexual abuse imagery.112 The defendant was later arrested and indicted for knowingly receiving,
transporting, and possessing a computer or computer-storage device containing child sexual
abuse imagery.113
Judge William Pryor first noted that “[i]mport restrictions and searches of persons or
packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different rules of
constitutional law from domestic regulations.”114 Next, he recounted that the Court has never
required reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the border—only for “highly intrusive
searches of a person’s body”115—nor has it distinguished between different types of property.116
Rejecting the importation of Riley-esque principles into the border search context, Justice Pryor
added that “electronic devices should not receive special treatment because so many people now

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id. at 1231.

114

Id. at 1232 (quoting United States v. 12, 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123,

125 (1973)).
115

Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (“Property and persons are different.”).

116

Id. at 1233; cf. Orin S Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a

“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?” 33 Conn. L. Rev. 503, 532 (2001) (predicting that judges
will “avoid creating one Fourth Amendment for the physical world and another for cyberspace”).
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own them or because they can store vast quantities of records or effects.” 117 Rather, he
contended, CBP officers bear the same responsibilities “regardless of advances in technology,
and “[i]f anything, the advent of sophisticated technological means for concealing contraband
only heightens the need of the government to search property at the border unencumbered by
judicial second-guessing.”118 Further, he argued that the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee
the right to travel without inconvenience, citing reduced privacy expectations at the border and
now-routine TSA screening procedures, and that passengers can leave any property they do not
want searched, but not their bodies, at home.119
Nonetheless, five years earlier, the Ninth Circuit mandated reasonable suspicion for
forensic electronic border searches in United States v. Cotterman.120 While attempting to enter

117

Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233; see also id. at 1234 (noting that, in Riley, the Court limited its

holding to the search-incident-to-arrest exception); id. at 1235 (citations and quotation marks
omitted) (“In Riley, the Supreme Court explained that the rationales that support the searchincident-to-arrest exception—namely the concerns of harm to officers and destruction of
evidence—did not ha[ve] much force with respect to digital content on cell phones because
digital data does not pose comparable risks. But digital child pornography poses the same exact
risk of unlawful entry at the border as its physical counterpart.”)
118

Id.; see also id. (“[C]hild pornography offenses overwhelmingly involve the use of electronic

devices for the receipt, storage, and distribution of unlawful images.”).
119

Id. at 1235.

120

709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th

Cir. 2019) (“clarify[ing] Cotterman by holding that ‘reasonable suspicion’ in this context means
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the United States from Mexico, the defendant was referred to secondary inspection after the
border agent discovered his prior conviction for seven counts relating to sexual conduct with
minors.121 Forensic examination of two laptops produced hundreds of images and videos of child
sexual abuse imagery.122 Judge Margaret McKeown first noted that, had the search ended with
the initial manual examination of the laptops, it would have been valid.123 Thus, no circuit split

that officials must reasonably suspect that the cellphone contains digital contraband,” rather than
digital evidence).
121

Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957.

122

Id. at 958.

123

Id. at 960. Judge McKeown supported this conclusion with the assertion that the search was

“in principle, akin to the search in [United States v. ]Seljan, where we concluded that a
suspicionless cursory scan of a package in international transit was not unreasonable.” Id.
However, the court in Seljan noted that the customs agents “opened and examined” three
different packages belonging to the defendant over eighteen months and subsequently opened
and carefully read the letters therein. 547 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2008). “It is a strange hierarchy
of values,” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 775 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting), that permits
scrupulous personal examination of private letters by the Government but bars the use of
software specifically designed to detect contraband that has been concealed. Cf. infra Part II.A.3
(contending that forensic electronic border searches are often less invasive than manual ones).
Later in her opinion, still oblivious to the facts of Seljan and the operational design of forensic
software, Judge McKeown compared the use of forensic software to “painstaking[ly] . . . reading
a diary line by line looking for mention of criminal activity.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962-63. But
29

exists with respect to the principle that manual or routine electronic border searches do not
require reasonable suspicion. She then justified a reasonable-suspicion requirement for forensic
electronic border searches based on heightened privacy concerns borne out of the volume and
intimate nature of the contents of electronic devices.124 Unlike the last three major Court
decisions on border searches, Ramsey, Montoya de Hernandez, and Flores-Montano, Judge
McKeown’s opinion all but omitted mention of the Government’s long-standing plenary
authority to conduct suspicionless border searches and the reduced privacy expectations of
international travelers, as Judge Consuelo Callahan elucidates in her concurrence in part. 125 Both
her opinion and the dissent reached the same conclusion as the majority in Touset.

see infra note 231 (noting that officers often only access a thumbnail preview of images and
videos that the software program identifies as relevant).
124

Id. at 964. But see id. at 977 (Callahan, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted) (quoting

United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (“‘[A] port of entry is
not a traveler’s home,’ even if a traveler chooses to carry a home’s worth of personal information
across it”).
125

See id. at 971 (Callahan, J., concurring in part) (“Accomplishing th[e] Herculean task [of

finding and excluding any and all illegal and unwanted articles before they cross the border]
requires that the government be mostly free from the Fourth Amendment’s usual restraints on
searches of people and their property. Today the majority ignores that reality by ejecting a new
rule requiring reasonable suspicion for any thorough search of electronic devices entering the
United States. This flouts more than a century of Supreme Court precedent, is unworkable and
unnecessary, and will severely hamstring the government’s ability to protect our borders.”)
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In Alasaad v. Nielsen, which was decided on November 12, 2019, the District Court for
the District of Massachusetts held that all electronic border searches, whether manual or forensic,
require reasonable suspicion.126 In one of the most recent challenges to CBP’s border search
authority, several plaintiffs asserted that CBP officers had violated their Fourth Amendment
rights under a wide variety of circumstances.127 Judge Casper reasoned that the fact that
electronic border searches are meant to uncover, inter alia, threats to national security and
contraband “is not a strong counterweight to the intrusion on personal privacy evidenced by such
searches” without citing any authority.128 She also noted that the “deterrent effect” of the border
search exception would not be significantly diminished under a reasonable suspicion
requirement.129 Further, Judge Casper maintained that, although only border searches of persons
have been deemed nonroutine by the Court, border searches of property can be nonroutine too
because of the nature and quantity of information on electronic devices—citing Riley—and the

126

See No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *14 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019) (finding

that there was no meaningful difference between the two classes of searches in terms of the
privacy interests implicated).
127

See generally Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1 (D. Mass.

May 9, 2018) (denying the government’s motion to dismiss and recounting the factual
allegations in detail).
128

Alasaad, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *9.

129

Id. at *10.
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inconvenience to which travelers would be subjected if they left their electronic devices at
home.130
B.

The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution

The Court has yet to rule on whether, or to what extent, the Fourth Amendment applies
extraterritorially to U.S. persons.131 Thus, for the time being, lower court precedents which are
largely in agreement, such as In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa132 and
United States v. Stokes,133 govern. The Court has, however, ruled on the extraterritorial
application of other parts of the Constitution and of the Fourth Amendment with respect to nonU.S. persons, and such rulings provide a useful foundation for understanding the above two
cases.
The Court has frequently wavered back and forth between more formal and more
functional approaches to extraterritoriality. A formal approach to extraterritoriality essentially
denies the extraterritorial application of the Constitution altogether, only recognizing its

130

Id. at *11-12.

131

However, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Brennan

noted that “nothing in the Court's opinion questions the validity of the rule, accepted by every
Court of Appeals to have considered the question, that the Fourth Amendment applies to
searches conducted by the United States Government against United States citizens abroad.” 494
U.S. 259, 283 n.7 (1990).
132

552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).

133

726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013).
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jurisdiction where the United States exercises de jure sovereignty.134 A functional approach
focuses more on elements of de facto sovereignty and the practical considerations of enforcing
the Constitution abroad.135 For example, the Court went from functional to formal to functional
again from Reid v. Covert136 to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez137 to Boumediene v. Bush,138
respectively.
In what are commonly known as the Insular Cases,139 the Court issued a series of
opinions at the beginning of the twentieth century following the United States’ acquisition of
various territories from Spain, addressing fundamental questions regarding the Constitution’s

134

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008). De jure sovereignty “implies a state's lawful

control over its territory generally to the exclusion of other states, authority to govern in that
territory, and authority to apply law there.” Id. at 754 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 206, cmt. b (1986)). However, determining whether a state
enjoys de facto sovereignty over a certain territory involves an objective assessment of the power
or control that that state exerts over such territory. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754. De facto
sovereignty does not require a claim of right. Id.
135

Id. at 764.
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354 U.S. 1 (1957).

137

494 U.S. 259 (1990)

138

553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);

Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
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geographic scope for the first time140 and finding that generally “the Constitution applies in full
in incorporated territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated
territories.”141 Underlying the latter part of this holding was a practical—although partly racist—
understanding that the extent to which the Constitution applies extraterritorially must still be
decided “as questions arise.”142 For example, in Dorr v. United States, the Court held that
Congress need not establish a system of laws that includes the right of trial by jury in the
Philippines, an unincorporated territory.143 Justice Day admitted that the people of the
Philippines were entitled to fundamental constitutional rights and that, as a fundamental right,
the right to trial by jury should logically “go[] wherever the jurisdiction of the United States
extends.”144 However, he ultimately concluded that trial by jury would be impossible to
implement in the Philippines, a “territory peopled by savages” who did not need or understand
such system, and would “work injustice and provoke disturbance rather than [] aid the orderly
administration of justice.”145
Then, in the post-World War II case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,146 the Court denied
habeas corpus protections to German soldiers who had been convicted of violating the laws of
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Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756 (2008).

141

Id. at 757.
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Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149.
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Id.
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339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
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Id.
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war and imprisoned, under U.S. custody, in Germany, “balance[ing] the constraints of military
occupation with constitutional necessities.”147 Its holding partially relied on the fact, if the
Constitution applied extraterritorially to enemy soldiers, that the Fifth Amendment would protect
such persons from military trial, and the Sixth from civil trial, thereby preventing any trial at
all.148 The Court also reasoned:
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them
across the seas for hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space,
guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for
whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call . . . . [During active hostiles,
s]uch trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.
They would diminish the prestige of our commanders . . . . It would be difficult to
devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very
enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own
civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad
to the legal defensive at home.149
Thus, here, as well as in the Insular Cases, practical considerations largely controlled the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution. Although this case partially turns on the
petitioners’ relationship to the United States, such analysis is not necessarily inconsistent with a
functional approach. After all, as this Comment will discuss below with respect to Reid v. Covert
and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, it leaves open the possibility that those persons outside
of territory under the United States’ de jure sovereignty with a closer relationship to the United
States can enjoy certain constitutional protections.
In Reid v. Covert, the Court rejected the idea that “when the United States acts against
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights,” finding that the Fifth and Sixth
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Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762.
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Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 782.
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Id. at 778-79.
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Amendments apply extraterritorially to U.S. citizens.150 Two civilian spouses, one in England
and the other in Japan, had killed their servicemember husbands and were tried by U.S. military
courts without a grand jury indictment or a jury pursuant to agreements with England and
Japan.151 Writing for the plurality, Justice Black first seized on the sweeping language contained
in both amendments, such as “no person” and “all criminal prosecutions.”152 He then noted that
the reason treaties—like the ones with England and Japan—did not have to be made in
“pursuance” of the Constitution in the same manner as federals laws was so that international
agreements made under the Articles of Confederation, including the peace treaties which
concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect.153 Although he largely relied on
legislative history to argue that the United States cannot exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions, Justice Black’s approach can be
categorized as formal because he spurned the suggestion that constitutional protections “are
inoperative when they become inconvenient.”154
Reid’s two concurring opinions, however, took a functional approach. In his concurrence,
Justice Frankfurter asserted that the geographic scope of the Constitution must be determined on
a case-by-case basis, consistent with the findings of the Insular Cases.155 Most importantly,
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354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
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Id. at 3-4.
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Id. at 8.
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Id. at 16-17.
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Id. at 14.
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Reid, 354 U.S. at 50-51 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Justice Harlan read the Insular Cases to hold that whether a constitutional provision has
extraterritorial effect depends upon the “particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and
the possible alternatives which Congress had before it” and whether judicial enforcement of the
provision would be “impracticable and anomalous.”156 This concurrence later served as the
analytical foundation for Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo and, later still, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene.157 Further, practical considerations significantly
influenced Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Verdugo.158
In Verdugo, the plurality held that the Fourth Amendment only applies extraterritorially
to persons with a “substantial connection” to the United States.159 Since the defendant was a
resident and citizen of Mexico and his property was in Mexico, Chief Justice Rehnquist found
that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable, and the Court did not address the level of
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment would require if the defendant had had a substantial
connection to the United States.160 Contrasting the Fourth Amendment’s “the people” with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment’s “no person” and examining the Fourth Amendment’s legislative
history, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “the people” refers to a class of persons who are part
of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with a particular

156

Id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).

157

See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008); id. at 770.
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Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273–74.
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Id. at 271.
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country to be considered part of that community.161 He also reasoned that, in contrast to the
Insular Cases, the alleged constitutional violation in this case occurred in a foreign territory,
where Fourth Amendment claims are “even weaker,” rather than in those territories governed by
Congress.162 As a practical matter, he noted that a warrant issued by a U.S. magistrate would be a
“dead letter” outside of the United States and requiring one would present great difficulties in
determining what is reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad.163
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy more closely aligned his analysis with the
functional approaches employed in the Insular Cases and Eisentrager. He reasoned that there is
“no rigid and abstract rule” that every provision of the Constitution applies extraterritorially, “no
matter what the conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to a specific
guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous.”164 Here, he found, adherence to the warrant
requirement would be impracticable and anomalous because of the absence of local judges or
magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of
reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign
officials.165
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Id. at 265–68.
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Id. at 268.
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Id. at 274.
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Id. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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In Boumediene, the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus extends to enemy alien
combatants held at Guantanamo Bay.166 With respect to Verdugo, Justice Kennedy only cited his
concurring opinion and not to the plurality, rejecting the Government’s arguments that the writ
did not apply because the United States does not have de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo.167
He examined the writ’s history, primarily through Scotland’s and Ireland’s legal relationship
with England at the time of the Constitution’s framing.168 Justice Kennedy reasoned that it ran to
Ireland, but not Scotland because English law applied in Ireland, but not in Scotland.169 This was
despite the fact that England had de jure sovereignty over Scotland but not over Ireland.170 Thus,
Justice Kennedy continued, the fact that no laws other than those of the United States apply at
Guantanamo weighs in favor of the writ’s extension.171 Further, he noted that the United States
clearly maintains de facto sovereignty over this territory.172 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy

166

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). For a compelling argument as to why the

Jury Trial Clause applies to enemy alien combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, see generally
Thomas McDonald, Comment, A Few Good Angry Men: Application of the Jury Trial Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to Non-Citizens Detained at Guantanamo Bay, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 701
(2013).
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cautioned that, under the Insular Cases, constitutional provisions should only be applied
extraterritorially “sparingly and where [they are] most needed.”173
Justice Kennedy ultimately devised three factors for determining the extraterritorial reach
of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving
the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.174 Applying the first factor, he distinguished between this
case and Eisentrager, noting that, although the petitioners were also not U.S. citizens, the
prisoners in Eisentrager received far greater procedural protections regarding the determination
that they were enemy combatants.175 Second, Justice Kennedy reasoned that, in contrast to the
German prison over which the United States held temporary control after World War II in
Eisentrager, Guantanamo “is no transient possession” and “is within the constant jurisdiction of
the United States.”176 Third, extending the writ would not interfere with the military mission of a
secure prison facility on a small, isolated, and heavily fortified military base; no other
government has competing jurisdiction over the territory; the detention facility is not located in
an active theater of war; and there are few practical barriers to the running of the writ.177
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1.

The Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amendment

Although the Court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the extraterritorial
application of the Fourth Amendment to U.S. citizens, several lower courts178 have held that the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness—and not the Warrant Clause—governs
extraterritorial searches of U.S. citizens.179 The most notable of such decisions is the Second

178

In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008);

United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Agosto-Pacheco,
No. 18-082 (FAB), 2019 WL 4566956, at *1, *9 (D.P.R. Sept. 20, 2019). Considering that In re
Terrorist Bombings came down more than five months after Boumediene, it is strange that the
Second Circuit did not cite or discuss Boumediene at all. Although the Boumediene holding was
relatively narrow, Justice Kennedy did not explicitly cabin it to the Suspension Clause, and one
would reasonably expect any federal court ruling on a question regarding the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution to address the legal effect of—at that time—the most significant
Supreme Court ruling on that question in almost two decades, even if the two cases address
different parts of the Constitution. Cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access
to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2107, 2108 (2009) (noting that
Boumediene raises the question of whether constitutional provisions other than the Suspension
Clause apply at Guantanamo).
179

See also Jay V. Prahbu, et al, When Your Cyber Case Goes Abroad: Solutions to Common

Problems in Foreign Investigations, 67 DOJ J. Fed. L. & Prac. 167, 178–79 (2019) (“Foreign
searches [] need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard . . . .”).
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Circuit’s in In Re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa.180 In this case, U.S.
intelligence agents conducted telephone surveillance in Kenya of the defendant, a U.S. citizen
and suspected Al Qaeda associate.181 On the basis of intelligence collected through such
surveillance, U.S. agents also searched the defendant’s home with the help of Kenyan
authorities.182
Judge Jose Cabranes first reasoned that neither search required a warrant because no legal
authority suggests otherwise; a warrant issued by a U.S. judicial officer would likely have no
legal significance abroad; and U.S. officials are not required to obtain warrants from foreign
judicial officers.183 He also noted that whether U.S. judicial officers are even authorized to issue
warrants for overseas searches is unclear.184 Nonetheless, U.S. officials must still meet the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, under which the totality of the circumstances
are examined to balance individual privacy interests and government interests.185
Judge Cabranes then found that the search of the defendant’s home was reasonable
because the Government had a powerful need to gather additional intelligence on Al-Qaeda’s
activities in Kenya, which it had linked to the defendant, and the intrusion on the defendant’s

180

Supra note 178.
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In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 159, 161.
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Id. at 160.
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Id. at 169–71.
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Id. at 171.
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Id. at 171–72.
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privacy was restrained and limited.186 He supported the latter conclusion with the following
facts: the search was not covert; it was during the daytime and in the presence of the defendant’s
wife; the scope of the search was limited to items which were believed to have foreign
intelligence value; proper minimization procedures were followed; and U.S. officials monitored
the defendant’s telephone communications for nearly a year before concluding that it was
necessary to search his home.187 Further, although Judge Cabranes described the telephone
surveillance as broad—encompassing calls made for commercial, family, or social purposes and
loosely minimizing the information collected—and as a significant invasion of privacy, it was
reasonable because of the inherent challenges of foreign intelligence collection.188

186

Id. at 174.

187

Id. at 173–74.

188

Id. at 175–76. Specifically, Judge Cabranes identified the following difficulties: (1) complex,

wide-ranging, and decentralized organizations warrant sustained and intense monitoring in order
to understand their features and identify their members; (2) foreign intelligence gathering of the
sort considered here must delved into the superficially mundane because it is not always readily
apparent what information is relevant; (3) members of covert terrorist organizations often
communicate in code or at least more ambiguous language, so more extensive and careful
monitoring of these communications may be necessary; and (4) because the monitored
conversations were conducted in foreign languages, the task of determining relevance and
identifying coded language was further complicated. Id.
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Another significant lower court decision is United States v. Stokes, 189 in which the
Seventh Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s earlier decision. In this case, the defendant,
originally a teacher in Miami, was placed on probation by a Florida court after indecently
touching two minors who were his students.190 He then received permission to complete his
probation in Thailand, where he engaged in sexual acts with minors for several years.191 In 2002,
ICE agents based in Thailand were tipped off to the fact that the defendant had been fired from
another teaching job in Bangkok for indecently touching male students, opening an investigation
thereafter.192 About ten months later, ICE agents and the Royal Thai Police searched the
defendant’s home in Thailand, recovering more than 6,000 images of the defendant’s sexual
activity with minors from a digital camera, multiple compact discs, and a computer.193
Prosecutors then indicted the defendant for traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of
engaging in a sexual act with person under eighteen years old and extradited him to the United
States.194 Judge Diane Sykes found that no warrant was required for the reasons cited in the
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726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Id. at 885.
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Id. at 885–86.
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Id. at 886–87.
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Second Circuit’s decision and that the warrantless195 search of the defendant’s home was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.196 She reasoned that investigators had probable cause
that the defendant had committed a crime and evidence of it would be found in his home.197
Judge Sykes also noted that the manner of the search was reasonable because the law
enforcement team acted pursuant to a Thai search warrant; the search took place during the
daytime hours; officers waited for the defendant to arrive before entering his home; the
defendant was not restrained during the search; containers were not broken open; and the entire
search only lasted about two hours.198

195

“There is no question that the warrant [issued by a Thai judicial officer] used very general

language,” and more importantly, there was no warrant issued by a U.S. judicial officer, so the
search was effectively warrantless. Id. at 891.
196

Id. at 893.

197

Id. (“Stokes had been fired from two Thai schools in one year for touching children

inappropriately. His colleagues at a third school told investigators that he continued to engage in
similar behavior. Stokes had a history of sexually assaulting children[ ] and a criminal conviction
for inappropriately touching a child in the United States. He was seen regularly hugging and
kissing one particular male student. Two credible informants separately indicated that Stokes, an
unmarried, middle-aged man, intimated that he was sexually attracted to children and boasted
about living with young Thai boys. ICE Investigators also verified through cooperation with Thai
authorities that a witness had, on at least one occasion, seen young boys reporting to Stokes's
private quarters.”)
198

Id.
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Although foreign intelligence collection is not one of the objectives of extraterritorial
electronic border searches, In re Terrorist Bombings, as well as Stokes, provide some guidance
as to under what circumstances an extraterritorial search is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment in general. These cases suggest that such searches are reasonable when there is no
damage to physical property; the scope of the search is limited to items that constitute digital
contraband or otherwise fall under CBP officers’ authority to inspect or exclude; the search was
not conducted covertly or without notice to the defendant; and the search is not too lengthy.199
All of these factors are consistent with border search jurisprudence’s definition of
reasonableness.200
II.

Analysis
This Comment’s analysis will proceed in two parts: first, arguing that forensic electronic

border searches conducted at the U.S. border and ports of entry do not require reasonable
suspicion;201 second, asserting that, even if they do, forensic extraterritorial electronic border
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Id.; In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d 157, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2008).
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See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S 149, 155-56 (2004) (damage to physical

property); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (finding that
detention of person being searched must be reasonably related to the circumstances which
justified it initially); United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he
individual is on notice that his privacy may be invaded when he crosses the border”); Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 543 (permitting CBP officers to detain an individual “for such time as
necessary to confirm their suspicions”).
201

See infra part II.A.
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searches at Preclearance locations do not.202 The first part will rely on the historical distinction
between searches of one’s person and one’s property; on the assertion that Riley and Carpenter
do not control the Court’s analysis in the border search context; and on the fact that forensic
electronic searches are often less invasive than manual searches.203 The second part will contend
(1) the Fourth Amendment applies at Preclearance locations; (2) travelers’ privacy expectations
are further reduced in a foreign country; and (3) the Government’s legitimate interests, already at
their “zenith” at traditional border control locations, are even greater at Preclearance locations.204
A.

Forensic electronic border searches do not require reasonable suspicion.

This part of my analysis will argue that forensic electronic border searches that are
conducted on U.S. territory do not require reasonable suspicion. First, this Comment will
distinguish between border searches of property and border searches of persons and examine
how the Ninth Circuit and the district court in Alasaad v. Nielsen failed to apply this distinction.
Second, it will demonstrate that Riley does not apply in the border search context. Third, this
Comment will note that forensic electronic searches can be less invasive of one’s privacy than
manual searches.

202

See infra part II.B

203

See infra part II.A.

204

See infra part II.B.
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1.

Searches of property and persons implicate fundamentally different
privacy interests.

That nonroutine border searches require reasonable suspicion, and that routine ones do
not, is undisputed.205 Further, most courts that require reasonable suspicion for forensic
electronic border searches do not contend that manual electronic border searches mandate such
suspicion.206 Thus, the issues are whether forensic electronic border searches are somehow
nonroutine and whether they implicate significantly different privacy interests than manual
searches. Border search jurisprudence, as well as other Fourth Amendment case law, answers in
the negative and suggests that a far greater disparity in privacy concerns exists between searches
of property and persons.
The Court has only found searches of the alimentary canal and strip, body cavity, and
involuntary x-ray searches—all of which are searches of the person—to be nonroutine.207
Dissenting from the majority opinion in Montoya de Hernandez, Justice Brennan went so far as
to suggest that a warrant should be required for intrusive searches of the person, which constitute
“an extreme invasion of personal privacy.”208 In contrast, in Flores-Montano, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explicitly distinguished between “highly intrusive searches of the person” and
searches of property, finding that vehicles can be searched at the border without reasonable

205

E.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2019).
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E.g., id. at 1016.
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985); id. at 541 n. 4.

208

Id. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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suspicion, and no justice disagreed.209 Further, while the Court has long, and often, held that “an
invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy,” congressionally-authorized suspicionless border searches of property
predate the Fourth Amendment.210
Applying the above principles to the facts of Alasaad v. Nielsen reveals how the Court
would decide such a case. In that case, plaintiffs sued CBP, alleging that several of its officers
violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when
the officers searched their electronic devices at ports of entry to the United States.211 Many of the
plaintiffs’ stories present minor or no issues under the Fourth Amendment and the border search
exception. The main complaint most plaintiffs had was that CBP officers searched their devices
without individualized suspicion,212 which officers may do for any other piece of property.213
Another concern was the length of time for which their persons and their devices were
detained.214 However, nothing in the facts suggests that either were detained for longer than
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United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
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Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (quotations marks omitted); Act of July 31,

1789, 1 St. 29, 43.
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Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 12,

2019).
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See e.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1, *5 (May 9,

2018) (denying motion to dismiss).
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Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 151-52.
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Alasaad, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *3.
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“necessary to confirm [the CBP officers’] suspicions” in violation of Montoya de Hernandez’s
holding.215 There, officers conducted a highly intrusive alimentary canal search and detained the
defendant for “almost 24 hours,”216 which the Court concluded was not unreasonably long.217
Here, officers generally examined the plaintiffs’ property for about twenty minutes and, at most,
three and a half hours.218 Even the fact that one plaintiff, a non-U.S. citizen,219 was personally
detained for seven hours while officers searched his phone pales in comparison to the detention
of the defendant in Montoya de Hernandez.220 Only the plaintiff whose phone’s functionality was
damaged has a colorable claim, given that the search was somewhat destructive of his
property.221
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985);
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Id.. at 546 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Id. at 544.
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See Alasaad, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5-*8.
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Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States

has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as
he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied
assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more extensive and secure
when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they expand to
those of full citizenship upon naturalization.”)
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Alasaad, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *6.
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United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2004).
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Although the Ninth Circuit argued that the Government could not reasonably expect
travelers to leave devices or files they did not want searched at home or on a home computer
because of the inconvenience that would impose, the Eleventh Circuit rightly countered that “the
Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the right to travel without great inconvenience.”222 To
support this assertion, Judge Pryor provided the example of the extensive TSA screening
procedures which are now required for all airplane passengers.223 Thus, although all the Alasaad
plaintiffs were undoubtedly subjected to “great inconvenience” while traveling, the
inconvenience associated with air travel—not to mention the centuries-old requirement that
international travelers must go through customs—is reasonably expected, and the Government
cannot be expected to abdicate its role in preventing the introduction of contraband into the
United States to spare less than one percent of international travelers to the United States from
inconvenience. In Flores-Montano, the Court likewise acknowledged that “[r]espondent points to
no cases indicating the Fourth Amendment shields entrants from inconvenience or delay at the
international border.”224
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United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018).
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Id.

224

Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n.3; see also United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 152 (4th

Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J. concurring) (“The general search that all of us must undergo at airports
attests to the difficulties of ensuring airborne security through individualized suspicion. Our new
world has brought inconvenience and intrusions on an indiscriminate basis, which none of us
welcome, but which most of us undergo in the interest of assuring a larger common good. Our
old world of relative security and relative privacy, if indeed it ever existed, is now gone with the
51

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit misapplied the Court’s note in Ramsey that it was not
deciding whether a border search might be deemed “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment
“because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”225 Judge McKeown
understood this note to mean that “particularly offensive” searches require reasonable
suspicion.226 However, this reading is inaccurate for at least two reasons. First, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained in Ramsey that “unreasonable” meant “embraced within the prohibition of
the Fourth Amendment,” or in other words, inconsistent with or in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.227 Second, in the footnote, “particularly offensive” modifies the “manner” of the
search, not the search itself.228 In this sense, while the act of searching an electronic device may
be particularly offensive to some due to, for instance, the contents of the device, theoretically,
the searcher must do so in an offensive manner to violate the Fourth Amendment.229 After all, in

wind. It is painful to dream of retrieving what is ours no longer.”); id. at 153 (“At what point the
domestic conveniences of cell phone use should ripen into transnational entitlements is primarily
for the political branches to determine.”).
225

United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977).
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United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 622.
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Id. at 618 n. 13.
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I say “theoretically” because the Court has never held a search to have been conducted in a

“particularly offensive manner.” United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004)
(“We again leave open the question ‘whether, and under what circumstances, a border search
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Montoya de Hernandez, the Court found the alimentary canal search was carried out in a
reasonable manner, although the “humiliating” or highly intrusive nature of such a search
requires reasonable suspicion.230 If a twenty-four-hour detention that included officials’ refusal
to allow the defendant to use the bathroom in private and a compulsory rectal examination can be
conducted in a reasonable manner, surely an impersonal, automatic, software-driven search of an
electronic device can be.231 That such searches can uncover highly personal private information
does not alter the Fourth Amendment calculus, since CBP officers have been searching physical
containers holding intimate articles without individualized suspicion for centuries.232 More
importantly, since the Court has only determined the level of suspicion required for “highly
intrusive [border] searches of the person,” no Supreme Court precedent supports the argument
that border searches of property may be, by their nature, highly intrusive of one’s privacy and

might be deemed unreasonable because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried
out (internal quotation marks omitted).’”).
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985).
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Cf. United States v. Feiten, No. 15-206, 2016 WL 894452 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (“The OS Triage[, a software used for forensic laptop searches,] is
actually less invasive of personal privacy than is a search done by hand. A border agent
inspecting a computer manually, page-by-page in an electronic format, would access any
document or program stored on the device, but a forensic preview using OS Triage merely
allows a thumbnail preview of pictures and videos on a computer and can identify which of those
pictures and videos have file names that match known file names of child pornography.”)
232

See supra note 27.
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require particularized suspicion.233 As this Comment argues below, to the extent that lower
courts have found that Riley is one such case, they are incorrect.
2.

Riley does not control the Court’s analysis in the border search context.

Riley, and the Riley-esque principles reaffirmed in Carpenter, do not apply electronic
border searches. In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless asserted that electronic devices are
different from every other type of property.234 Judge McKeown wrote, “[t]he private information
individuals store on digital devices—their personal ‘papers’ in the words of the Constitution—
stands in stark contrast to the generic and impersonal contents of a gas tank.”235 Of course, given
the scarcity of border search jurisprudence and recency of the Flores-Montano decision, Judge
McKeown’s choice of a gas tank as a piece of property other than an electronic device to which
she could compare electronic devices is not surprising. Nonetheless, if Judge McKeown wished
to make a true distinction between electronic devices and other types of property, she would have
chosen a closer analogue: a physical object with non-generic and personal contents. For example,
if one instead compares electronic devices to brief cases filled with medical and financial
records, her distinction falls away.
Regardless, the purpose of this Comment, much less this section, is not to argue that
Riley was wrongly decided or that Riley-esque principles do not have their place in certain
contexts. Rather, this section seeks to demonstrate that Riley does not control in the border
search context. After all, the Court did not intend for its Riley holding to be applied outside of
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Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
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the search-incident-to-arrest context, with Chief Justice Roberts warning against “untether[ing]
the rule from the justifications underlying the” exception.236
Ensuring officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence justify the searchincident-to-arrest exception, which are entirely distinct justifications from any that could be
reasonably associated with the border search exception, such as preventing the introduction of
contraband into the United States.237 Therefore, applying Riley to the border search context
would be inconsistent with Riley itself.238 Further, in Riley, Chief Justice Roberts narrowly
resolved the issue of whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies to cellphones by
reasoning that neither justification for the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies, arguably
making his discussion of the privacy interests implicated by cellphone searches dicta.239
Consequently, it would be even more far-fetched to apply Riley’s principles out of context.
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Id. at 205 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014)); see also Helen Hong,

Border Searches of Digital Devices, 67 DOJ J. Fed. L. & Prac. 199, 207 (2019) (“[U]nlike the
Supreme Court in Riley, the majority [in Cotterman] did not focus on whether border searches of
digital devices bear some nexus to the justification for supporting the searches as a category.”).
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Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[In Riley,] the Supreme

Court expressly limited its holding to the search-incident-to-arrest exception.”).
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See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.
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Nonetheless, in Alasaad, Judge Casper reasoned that Riley could be applied to the border
search context largely because both exceptions tilt in favor of the Government.240 Any time
courts permit the government to conduct searches and seizures without a warrant they are, by
definition, recognizing that government interests outweigh individual privacy interests and
weighing their analysis in favor of the Government.241 That Chief Justice Roberts himself in
Riley left open the question of whether “other case-specific Riley exceptions may still justify a
warrantless search of a particular phone” suggests that it is equally, if not more, likely that the
border search exception continues to apply to cellphones and other electronic devices as it does
to other forms of property in the absence of an explicit Court holding to the contrary.242
Bolstering this wager is the fact that both phone searches at issue in Riley were manual.243 Thus,
relying on Riley to require reasonable suspicion for forensic electronic border searches, but not
for manual ones—which, in the electronic border search context, is the one principle on which
most lower courts agree244—involves a strange contortion of precedent that ignores the distinct
facts and reasoning of Riley.
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Alasaad v. Nielsen, No.17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 WL 5899371, at *1, *12 (D. Mass. Nov. 12,
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the border search exception is “unaffected” by Riley).
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See supra part I.A.1.
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3.

Forensic electronic border searches are often less invasive than manual
ones.

Requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic electronic border searches, but not for
manual searches, is a perplexing holding because the former are often less invasive than the
latter. A border officer inspecting an electronic device manually could access any document or
program stored on the device.245 However, one kind of forensic software used to inspect laptops
only allows a thumbnail preview of pictures and videos on the laptop and identifies which of
those pictures and videos have file names that match those known files of child sexual abuse
imagery.246 This software “cannot locate deleted files or files that may be stored in carved or
unallocated space nor can it access files that have been password-protected.”247 The use of this
software—which one judge called an “exercise of electronic restraint on the part of border
agents”248—is not dissimilar to a canine sniff for narcotics in a piece of luggage, where the only
information the sniff discloses is the presence or absence of contraband.249 Thus, that a canine
sniff is not even a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment supports the notion that
forensic searches, which often only disclose the presence or absence of digital contraband such
as child sexual abuse imagery, do not require reasonable suspicion.250 Further, if one views
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electronic devices as digital equivalents to homes at the border, any software that locates deleted
files is merely searching the digital analog of garbage abandoned and left outside the curtilage of
the home. The latter is not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, so neither is the
former.251
B.

Forensic extraterritorial border searches may be conducted without reasonable
suspicion.

In general, “when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can[not] do so free of
the Bill of Rights.”252 However, whether a particular provision of the Constitution applies
extraterritorially must be determined “as questions arise.”253 Specifically, one must consider
whether judicial enforcement of the constitutional provision in question would be “impracticable
and anomalous.”254 At Preclearance locations, CBP officers perform the same border search
function that they do at traditional border and port of entry locations, exercising authorities for
the search of the person and property of U.S. persons.255 Judicial enforcement of the Warrant
Clause abroad with respect to electronic border searches would be “impracticable” and
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“anomalous” for the reasons cited in In re Terrorist Bombings.256 Specifically, (1) a warrant has
never been required for any border search;257 (2) the Preclearance agreements concluded thus far
have not included a warrant requirement;258 (3) U.S. warrants would be a “dead letter” abroad;259
and (4) it is unclear whether U.S. judicial officers possess the authority to issue warrants for
extraterritorial searches.260 However, several courts have at least proven their ability to assess the
reasonableness of extraterritorial searches.261
In cases in which the Court has found that a particular constitutional provision does not
apply extraterritorially, such as Eisentrager and Verdugo, the main pitfall was the defendants’
relationship to the United States—or the lack thereof—a non-issue with respect to U.S.
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persons.262 Thus, at least with respect to U.S. persons, the Fourth Amendment applies to forensic
extraterritorial electronic border searches at Preclearance locations.263 Further, because CBP
officers perform the same function that they do at traditional border locations, Preclearance
locations act as functional equivalents of the border, and the border search exception applies.264
Additionally, the Government’s legitimate interests, already at their “zenith” at traditional
border locations, are even greater at Preclearance stations, and since Fourth Amendment claims
are generally weaker where the United States does not enjoy de jure sovereignty, travelers’
privacy expectations are further reduced abroad.265 With respect to the former, the establishment
of Preclearance locations builds on the traditional justification for the border search exception,
preventing the introduction of contraband into the United States. After 9/11 and, in particular, the
attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit on
December 25, 2009, the Preclearance program was greatly expanded to “address threats at the
earliest possible point” and stop terrorists who sought to “avoid U.S. screening and targeting
efforts by carrying out attacks on U.S.-bound aircraft before arrival in the United States.”266 Thus,
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even if territorial forensic electronic border searches require reasonable suspicion, extraterritorial
ones do not because the balance of interests favors the Government. However, were an
extraterritorial electronic border search ever to be challenged as unlawful, the court would have
to consider the In re Terrorist Bombings and Stokes factors listed above: whether there was any
damage to physical property; whether the scope of the search was appropriately limited; whether
the search was conducted covertly or without notice to the defendant; and whether the search
was longer than necessary to confirm the officers’ suspicions.267
Conclusion
Before the Fourth Amendment was even ratified, U.S. customs officers exercised plenary
authority to prevent the entry of contraband into the United States and to search ships and other
containers in furtherance of that powerful governmental interest. Despite this longstanding
authority, lower courts have been sharply divided on whether to restrict CBP’s ability to inspect
electronic media at the border or functional equivalents of the border because of the privacy
concerns that they implicate or whether to empower CBP to flexibly respond to a novel medium
for smuggling easily hidden digital contraband into the United States. An additional

May/FY16_Preclearance_Guidance_Feb2016_05%2016%2016_final_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,
2020); see also 9/11 Commission Report 389 (2004), available at http:// www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (“The further away from our borders that screening
occurs, the more security benefits we gain.”); see generally Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking
Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the Forward Deployment of the U.S. Border, 44
Hous. L. Rev. 189 (2007) (describing U.S. efforts to “push the border outward” and asserting
their validity under international law).
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complicating factor that this Comment has considered is extraterritoriality. In other words, it has
examined what level of suspicion is required for electronic border searches at CBP Preclearance
locations.
First, this Comment demonstrated that searches of one’s person implicate far greater
privacy concerns than searches of property; Riley does not control in the border search context;
and forensic electronic border searches are often less invasive than manual ones, all for the
proposition that forensic electronic border searches at the U.S. border and ports of entry do not
require reasonable suspicion. Then, it noted that, based on the Supreme Court precedent
available and harmonious lower court jurisprudence, the Fourth Amendment applies to U.S.
persons abroad and maintained that CBP officers at Preclearance locations are only subject to a
flexible reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment. This reasonableness
requirement weighs in favor of not imposing an unduly burdensome reasonable suspicion
constraint on CBP officers at Preclearance locations, given the further reduced privacy
expectations of travelers at these locations and the further heightened government interest in
preventing the entry of contraband and dangerous persons into the United States.
Some have gone so far as to argue that the required level of suspicion for electronic
border searches is “principally a legislative question, not a judicial one” and that the political
branches “are much better equipped . . . to appreciate both the privacy interests at stake and the
magnitude of the practical risks involved.”268 However, until Congress enacts legislation on this
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issue, courts should apply border search doctrine pursuant to longstanding jurisprudence and
historical practice that accords significant deference to the Executive Branch in this context. CBP
Preclearance, and customs inspections in general, may be highly “vexatious” at times, but it is
quickly becoming the United States’ first line of defense in an increasingly interconnected and
increasingly complex world that requires elastic and innovative legal doctrines to permit the
detection of the very few items and enemies who mean us harm.

elective branches would downgrade the significant privacy interests the majority rightly
identifies? Might the other two branches, if given a fair chance, have something to say? And do
not Articles I and II, which set forth the legislative and executive roles in matters of grave
international import, give them the right to say it? Who are we to propound the idea that
democratic bodies, where Fourth Amendment reasonableness is concerned, have nothing to
contribute?”).
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